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IN THE SUPREM.E CO,URT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRANK BILL TOM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 10241

DAYS OF '47
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STAT·EMEN·T OF KIND O·F CAS·E
'This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained by him in an accident at the
Utah State Fair Grounds in July, 19·62, when he fell from
the bleachers while watching a rodeo sponsored by defendant, Days of '47.

The jury returned a special verdict in plaintiff's
favor in the arnount of $18,548.80, and judgment was entered thereon against defendant and appellant.

RELIEF SO·UGHT ON APPE·AL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgn1ent below
and entry of judgment in its favor and against plaintiff,
no cause of action, or, that failing, a new trial.
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Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant
and ~ppellant Days of '47, Inc., Utah State F-air Association, and Hutchinson-Mills Rodeo. (R. 1-3). The action as against the State Fair Association was dismissed
on its motion under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Hutchinson-Mills was never served, and never appeared.
The action was tried as against this appealing defendant
only.
Plaintiff, with members of his family, came to the
Utah State Fair Grounds to attend a performance of the
Days of '47 Rodeo in July, of 196·2. (R. 1, 4). The date
was generally agreed to be July 21st, (R. 184), although
plaintiff and members of his family persisted in fixing it
at July 7th, and the complaint so alleged. (R. 1). Admittedly, plaintiff and members of his family did not purchas·e admission tickets. (R. 106, 193). According to
plaintiff's testimony, he intended to compete in the rodeo
as a bronco rider, but he arrived late and there were no
mounts left for him. (R. 193). However, he and members
of his family were granted free admission to the rodeo.
(R. 106, 193). They sat in the bleachers. (R. 82, 105, 176,
Ex. 2). However, they did not all sit together. ·Plaintiff
and his two sons sat on the top row, or near the top of the
bleacheTs. (R. 82, 105, 176.) Plaintiff's wife and daughters sat two or three rows in front of him. (R. 82, 1051
176, Eoc. 2.)
A Brahma bull charged the fence encircling the
arena and broke over it or through it and onto the track
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in front of the grandstand. (R. 87, 88, 133, 2!65, 276., 282.)
In the ensuing confusion, plaintiff in some manner fell
from the bleachers to the ground underneath, s11staining
an injury to his head, and other lesser injuries. Plaintiff
testified that the bull attempted to come up into the
bleachers, and that he moved forward to meet him, hoping thereby to protect his family from injury. (R. 18?187, 195, 196, 197, 198.) He "tried to grab the rope" (R.·
186) which was hanging on the bull, hoping to fasten it
to something, and thus detain the bull so that his family
could escape. (R. 186, 196, 198.) His last memory was
of moving forward to me·et the bull and grabbing the
rope. (R. 187, 198.) He believed that he was thrown by
the bull over the grandstand. (R. 186, 19 6.)
1

No other witness who testified s~w how the plaintiff got from the grandstand to the ground. His two
sons, who were with him, jumped from the top· of the
grandstand to the ground and ran away. (R. 87-89.) They
did not see their father again until they returned and
found him lying unconscious on the ground. (R. 90~91,
107, 109.) They did not know how he fell from the grandstand. (R. 107.) Plaintiff's wife and two daughters also
jumped from the grandstand, but did not see how plaintiff fell from the grandstand to the ground. ( R. 178, 180,
181.) No other witness produced by either party claiined
to have any knowledge concerning the plaintiff's fall.
(R. 145, 265-266, 282.) However, Woolas Macey, a witness called by plaintiff, testified that the· bull did not
enter the ·grandstand, and there was no surging or
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scrambling backward by the crowd. ( R. 1±5). Officer
Lester Rich also testified that the bull did not enter the
grandstand. (R,. 27 4.)
. A fence expert produced by the plaintiff who did not
examine the fence at the time of the accident, but nearly
two years afterward, testified that the fence at the Fair
Grounds arena was inadequate for rodeo purposes~ (R.
160). In particular, he testified that the fencing (chainlink) should have been on the inside rather than the outside of the fence posts ( R. 161) ; that the wire holding
the fencing to the posts was inadequate (R. 160) ; that it
should have been a great deal higher; that there should
have been a tension wire on the bottom of the fence; and
also that there should have been a different type of "eye"
tops on the fence posts. (R,. 158.) His testimony was rebutted by witnesses called by defendant, (R. 270), who
testified that the fence was a "'way above average rodeo
fence," and in their opinion was reasonably adequate for
rodeo purposes. (R. 272, 290.) Moreover, there was
substantial testimony that when the bull escaped, the
fence yielded because the posts bent over, permitting the
entire fence to he knocked down, rather than because o~
any separation of the fencing from the posts. (R. 265,
283.) In short, the defects to \vhich plaintiff's expert
testified (even if conceded as defects) did not permit the
bull to escape. The part of the fence which yielded
was the posts supporting it, and no witness, expert or
otherwise, testified that they "\vere inadequate posts, or
that they were not adequately emplaced or secured.
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Plaintiff claimed, by way of damages, a head injury
resulting in dizziness, headaches and . impairment of
1nernory, iinpairinent of hearing in his right ear, and
other lesser injuries which healed uneventfully. (R. 221) .
. t\.dmittedly
.
plaintiff had sustained many injuries prior to
the accident including the loss of an eye in a mine acci ..
dent (R. 78, 203); a skull fracture during childhood (R.
203, 214) ; fracture of the left elbow (R. 203, 204) ; fracture of the left tibia (R. 203) ; wound of the left upper
arm (R. 204), and an old injury to the right knee. (R.
210.) He also sustained at least two injuries after his
accident at the rodeo, and before the time of trial, which
will be more particularly noted hereafter.
He was attended immediately after the accident by
Dr. Stewart Wright, a neuro- surgeon .. (R. 201.) He was
confined in St. ~iark's Hospital for approximately 17
days following the accident, on a program of bed rest
and prophylactic treatment to prevent infection, and
particularly meningitis. (R. 207, 221.) Plaintiff made
normal progress during his hospitalization (R. 207-8),
and after he was discharged on August 7th, was not seen
again by Dr. Wright until November 5, 1963. (R. 208.)
Up to this time Dr. Wright had detected no evidence of
impaired cerebration or Inemory. (R. 208.) At that thne
he had no coinplaints of headaches, but he did complain
of periodic dizziness and intpaired hearing in the right
ear. (R. 208.) At that tiine he had a laceration and abrasion between the eye-brows and he related that he had
been struck by a bottle a few days before. (R.. 209, 223.)
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-Dr. Wright next and last saw him before trial on
May 22, 1964. (R. 210.) At that time there was still no
complaint of headaches ( R. 210, 225), but plaintiff cornplained that he was still weak. He was, however, using
crutches because of an old knee injury, and he also related that he had been hospitalized by another blow on
the head received in J-anuary of 1964. This was identified by other witnesses as a blow from a car jack. (R.
116.) The period of hospitalization was not determined,
but the blow was sufficient to render plaintiff unconscious, and he was dizzy for a month afterward. (R. 210,
226.) On this visit he complained for the first time of impairment of memory. (R. 213, 225.)
Dr. Wright did not undertake to estimate the extent
or percentage of disability sustained by the plaintiff as
a result of the rodeo accident. (R. 213.) He admitted, on
cross-examination, that the impairment in hearing could
have resulted from the skull fracture which was sustained in childhood. (R. 214.) He admitted that linear skull
fractures of the type sustained by plantiff normally heal
(R~ 218), and that there was no indication of intracranial abnormality in plaintiff. (R. 218.) He also admitted, somewhat reluctantly, and after being pressed,
that being hit in the head \vith a bottle could account for
plaintiff's headaches and dizziness. (R. 223.) With equal
reluctance he admitted that the claimed impairment of
memory could have resulted from the blow of January
1, 19·64. (R.. 226.) A Hoffn1an sign, never noted before
the May exarnination, also could have resulted from the
latter accident. (R. 228.)
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. Dr. vVhitney .Haight, an otolaryngologist, testified
that he examined the plaintiff on May 22, 1964. (R. 2.32.)
Upon this examination he found a diminution of hearing
in the right ear (the injured ear) in the amount of 30
percent; and loss of hearing in the left ear (the uninjured
ear) of 50 percent. (R. 232, 233.) He stated that he was
unable to state the cause of the hearing loss. (R. 233.)
In response to a direct question by the court, he stated
that he couldn't tell whether the impairment was due to
trauma, disease or congenital causes. (R. 233.) Defendant therefore moved to strike his testimony, which motion was at first granted, but later over-ruled, apparently
on the basis of some earlier testimony by plaintiff and
his son that he had no impairment of hearing prior to
the accident. (R. 233-234.)
On cross-examination Dr. Haight testified that the
hearing impairment was due to some injury, damage or
deterioration of the auditory nerve; that it would be
impossible to determine the cause of it. (R. 235.) On
re-direct he testified that it would be impossible to determine whether the disability was from injury, degeneration, aging or toxic materials. (R. 236.) Although a fracture sufficien~ to cause loss of blood and spinal fluid
would probably cause some hearing loss (R. 237), he admitted on re-cross examination that bleeding and loss
of spinal fluid could not account for thP loss of hearing
in the left ~ar, which was greater than the loss of hearing
in the injured ear.. :(R. 237.) He further admitted that
there was no way of determining which of plaintiff's sev-
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eral accidents caused the loss of hearing, even if it was of
traumatic origin. ( R. 238.)
Plaintiff and his fa1nily normally contracted to work
in the sugar beet fields during the summer months. (R.
76-77, 9'4.) They would start working about May 20th
and return to their home on the reservation around August 1st, so that the children could resume their schooling.
(R. 77.) At the time of the accident plaintiff and his
family were working for a farmer in Centerfield. (R. 9394.) After plaintiff's injury his family completed the
contract, (R. 93, 113), and after plaintiff's discharge
from the hospital, the family returned to their home
on the reservation in accordance with their usual custom.
There was no evidence whatsoever as to what proportion
of the work of the family unit was normally done by the
plaintiff. There was no evidence that either he or his
family lost any income from their regular occupations
during the summer of 1962. There was no evidence that
plaintiff lost any income fron1 any employment that he
might reasonably have anticipated during the winter of
1962-63. Plaintiff and his family went to work in the beet
fields near Blackfoot, Idaho, in the summer of 1963 at
the usual time. (R. 101-102, 190, 240.) Plaintiff was able
to work with his family. (R. 240.) There -is no evidence
that they did not get their usual contract rate, or that
plaintiff did not perform his usual proportion of the total
work performed by the family. In short, there is no evidence whatsoever that plaintiff or his family sustained
any loss of income or earning capacity whatsoever as a
result of the accident.
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The case was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. (R. 38, 53-56.) By its answer to interrogatory
~1, the jury found that plaintiff fell from the bleachers
because of the movement of the crowd. (R. 5·3.) There
\vas absolutely no evidence whatsoever that a:r;1y movenlent of the crowd caused or contributed to cause the
plaintiff to fall.
The jury also found that plaintiff did not fall while
attempting to contain the bull. ( R. 54.) Plaintiff testified
that he was attempting to grab the rope on the bull when
he fell. (R. 186, 19·5-196, 197.) This was the only explanation offered by any witness as to how the accident occurred. Clearly the jury did not accept this explanation.
The jury further found that defendant was guilty of
negligence, which was a proximate cause of the accident
(R. 55) and assessed plaintiff's damages at $18,548.80
(R. 56). Plaintiff's special damages for ~edical care,
in the amount of $548.80, were undisputed. Therefore,
$18,000 of the verdict must be allocated to general damages.
Before submission of the case to the jury, defendant
moved for a directed verdict, which motion was summarily denied. (R. 29·3.) After entry of the judgment on
the verdict, (R. 57), defendant duly filed its motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial
(R. 61.) This motion was denied after argurnent (R. 62.).,

and this appeal followed. (R. 63.)
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ARGUMEN·T
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S SPECIAL FINDING #1.

T·he initial question presented to the jury by the
special verdict was to determine the cause;·· or causes of
plaintiff's fall. The first choice suggested was that the
surging of the crowd backward caused the fall. The jury
answered this in the affirmative.
As we have heretofore noted in our statement of
facts, there was no testimony from any witness to the
accident that any movement of the crowd in any way
caused, or contributed to cause, the plaintiff's fall from
the bleachers. The only testimony whatsoever, as to the
cause of plaintiff's fall, was his own testimony, which
was to the effect that he attempted to control the bull
by moving forward and grasping one of the ropes hanging on it, as a resut of which he was thrown from the
bleachers. ·The jury's finding #1, the refore, rests on pure
conjecture and speculation, and cannot be permitted to
stand.
By its special finding #2, the jury specifically rejected plaintiff's version of the accident. Thus the only
evidence as to how the accident was caused, failed to persuade the jury. However, the finding of causation upon
which plaintiff's judgment rests, was and is without
evidentiary support and is therefore fatally defective.
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It is elementary that a verdict unsupported by evidence 'vill not be permitted to stand. See 39 Am. J ur.,
145-146, New Trial §128:
BA special verdict will be set aside where it
is shown to be contrary to the evidence in the
case or to be unsustained by the evidence."
To the srune effect see 53 An1. J ur., 755-6, Trial
§ 1089:
"In the absence of evidence to support a material finding, it may be set aside or stricken from
the record, and in the discretion of the court judgment may be entered in accordance with the undisputed evidence in the case, or the verdict may
be set aside entirely and a new trial granted."
This particular finding of fact is essential to plaintiff's cause of action. It is fundamental that plaintiff
must not only prove negligence, but also that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and loss.
See 4 Am. J ur., 2d 217, Amusements and Exhibitions §94:
"As in other negligence cases, in order to
hold liable, for personal injuries or death, an
owner or operator of a place of public arnusement
or of an amusement device, on the basis of negligence, not only must his negligence be established but it must also be established that such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the injury or death for which recovery is sought. ***"
POINT II.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION #12 WAS TANTAMOUNT
TO A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF NEGLI-·
GENCE, AND WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.
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The court's instruction #12 reads as follows:
"You are further instructed that the defendant was under a duty to see ·that the fende was
safe for the use for which it w1as intended, viz.,
to keep the bull out of the bleachers and in the
arena; and in that connection you are instructed
that it had a duty to so construct the fence so that
it would serve the purposes for which it was intended and to use reasonable diligence commensurate with the risk involved to inspect it from
time to time and see that it was kept in a proper
condition to keep the animals in the arena; and if
the defendant failed in either of these duties, it
would be negligent." (Emphasis ours.)
It will be noted that by this instruction .the court
placed upon the defendant the burden of an absolute insurer, or guarantor, that the fence, as constructed, was
absolutely safe or "bull proof," plus the further duty of
exercising reasonable care to see that it was maintained
in that condition. Assuming that plaintiff was in the
status of an invitee (which we deny) defendant's only
duty toward him would be to exercise rea.sonable care
under the circumstances, to see that the fence was reasonably safe for the use for which it was intended.
While the court correctly instructed the jury that
the duty in connection with inspection was to use ''reasonable diligence commensurate with the risk involved," it
placed the defendant under an absolute duty "to see that
the fence was safe for the use for which it was intended,
viz. : to keep the bull out of the bleachers and. in the
arena." The delineating of two separate dutjes was obvi-
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ously done advisedly. The court concluded the instruction by saying that if the defendant failed in "either"
of these duties, it was negligent.
Since the bull admittedly escaped through
or over the fence, there was under the court's instruction a clear violation of one of the duties therein set forth.
Thus the instruction is tantamount to advising the jury
that as a matter of law defendant was negligent in failing
to furnish a Hbull proof" fence. This disregards entirely the testimony of defendant's witnesses as to the
quacy of the fence, and flies into the teeth of the law.
The general principles governing the operation of
an amusement or exhibition for public entertainment are
set forth in 4 Am. Jur. 2d under the title Amusements
and Exhibitions as follows :
Page 168:
"§ 52. While the proprietor or operator of a
place of public amusement or entertainment is
held to a sl!'icter accountability for injuries to
patrons than owners of private premises generally, the rule is that he is not an ins:urer of their
safety. * * * The proprietor or operator of a
place or facility of public amusement or entertainment is bound to exercise only 'orqjnary' or
're~ble' care for the safety and protection
of his patrons-that is, the care which an ordinarily prudent person, rather than the care which
a cautious man of more than average prudence,
would have exercised under the same or similar
circumstances."
Page 197:
"§ 74. Those who conduct horse shows, dog
shows, and other domestic animal exhibitions 1nust
exercise reasonable care to proctect spectators or
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·exhibitors from harm from anmials on exhibition
and this is true even through the animal exhibited'
has no known vicious propensity. * * *"
P'age 198:
·"§ 75. The exhibition of wild animals is
judicially recognized as lawful, whether the exhibition is carried on as a business or in connection
with and as an attraction to some other business.
The exhibitor is, however, held to a v.~
de~e to see that his premises are safe
and to give warning of dangers of which he knows,
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, the basis of liability being 'neglvgence in
. .; restraining the animal .." (Emphasis ours.)

A case specifically applying these principles to the
operator of a rodeo is Zuniga v. Storey, (Tex. 'Civ. App.)
239 SW2d 125. In that case, a Brahma hull escaped
from its pen in the rodeo, and ultimately attacked plaintiff in his own yard. In holding that the issue of defendant's negligence was for the jury the court said:
"While operators of rodeos ... are not liable
as insurers, they are obligated to use reasonable
care in keeping their show animals securely penned and housed so they will not get loose upon
the public street. . . . "
S·ee also Va.ughn v. Miller Bros. "10'1" Ranch Wild
West Show, 109 W. Va. 170, 153 SE 289·, where the court
said:
'·'In this country the right to exhibit wild
animals is judicially recognized. 'The conducting
of shows for the exhibition of wild ... animals
is a lawful business.' . . . The idea is no longer
indulged that it is prima facie negligence-to keep
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or exhibit wild animals. . . . Hence the gist of
Inodern actions against exhibitors cannot be the
mere keeping of savage animals, but must be
neglect to restrain them."

In Haberlin v. Peninsula Celebration Assn., (Cal.
App.), 319 P.2d 418, plaintiff was injured by a horse
which came off the race track out of control during a
rodeo celebration. Said the Court:

The evidence in this case fails to establish
negligence of defendant as a matter of law. As
questions of fact the evidence would have justified a finding that defendant was not negligent or
a finding that plaintiff assumed the risk of danger
from horses in the restricted area or a finding
that if defendant was negligent plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence. * * *"
1

"

An instruction based upon the principles enunciated
by the foregoing authorities was requested by defendant
(#5) as follows :

"You are instructed that the owner or operator of a place of business is not an insurer of the
safety of his patrons. His only duty is to exercise
reasonable care to make the premises reasonably
safe for persons invited to come there, commensurate with the purposes for which the place of
business is maintained." (R. 17).
The trial judge apparently took the view that the
keeping and showing of rodeo stock brought defendant
within the principles of absolute liability for harboring
wild beasts. However, as shown by the authorities above '-set forth, that doctrine is now passe, if in fact it ever
really e!Xisted, and in any event has not been applied to
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rodeo stock. Moreover, as observed by this court in the
recent case of Robison v. Robison, ______ Ut. 2d ______ , 39± P.
2d 876, 877:
"* * * It is to be observed that even where
the circumstances justify its application, this socalled rule of absolute liability has the weakness
of most generalities. ·There are almost always
exceptions which prove them fallacious. A. commonly used example is the application of the rule
to the keeping of a wild animal, such as a chained
bear. But if the person .i.njured has deliberately
teased the animal, or been so reckless of his safety
as to practically invite injury, he cannot recover.
It will thus be seen that the so-called rule of 'absolute liability' is not absolute at all. B~th the propriety of its application in the first instance, and
any defenses against it,. are conditioned by the
limitations imposed by the fundamental standard
which pervades all tort law; the conduct of the
reasonable prudent man under the circumstances;
and its procedura-l coroll~ry., that whenever there
is disp,ute in the evidence, or uncertainty therein,
as to whether that standard is met, the question
is for the jury to determine."
POINT. III.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE WEIGHTED IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY, AND DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF DEFENSE WAS NOT SUBMITTED TO
THE JURY.
POIN'T IV.
T'HE CO,URT'S INS'TRUCTION #13 WAS A ~COMMENT ON
THE EVIDENiCE, AND UNFAIRLY EMPHAJSIZED PLAINTTFF'S 'T,HE'ORY OF RE COV:ERY .
1

. . We argue the two foregoing points together, since
they involve basically the same problems. We have heretofore noted the language of the court's instruction #12.·
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the court's instruction #13 read as follows :
"Evidence has been introduced in this case
indicating that at the time of the accident the
fence through which the Brahma bull charged
had been constructed with the chain link wire on
the grandstand side of the posts rather than on
· the arena side and that the fence was without a
rail or tension wire or other obstruction between
the ground and the bottom of the fence. It is for
you to determine if these matters constituted negligence in the construction and maintenance of the
fence on the part of the defendant, and you should
also consider the type of fastening which was used
in holding the fence to the posts and the top railing; and if from all of the matters given in evidence before you in connection with this fence
you can say by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant did not act as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or
similar circumstances, then the defendant would
be negligent; but if in connection with these matters as you find them to be you believe the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would
have acted under the same or similar circumstances; or if you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not it so acted, then you cannot find
that there was negligence."
By this instruction the court comrnented improperly
and fully upon the plaintiff's theory of the case. It mentioned, item by item, various alleged defects in the fence,
as testified by plaintiff's witness McLaughlin. While the
instruction reviewed the evidence relied upon by plaintiff to prove negligence in the construction of the fence,
it ignored completely defendant's theory that it was "a
way above average" rodeo fence; and reasonably suited
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18·
for the purposes intended, as testified by the witnesses
Rudd and Whitesides.
The instruction #13 also had the vice of unduly emphasizing plaintiff's theory of the case. By the court's
instruction #12 the jury had already been advised that
defendant had a duty of furnishing a "bull proof" fence.
It could serve no useful purpose to point out to the jury
all of the possible defects which might make the fence
"non-bull proof."
The absence of any instruction setting forth any
theory of defense and the repetition of instructions setting forth the plaintiff's theory of recovery also brings
the case within the rule of the recent case of Taylor v.
Johnson, ______ Utah 2d ------, 393 P.2d 382, 388 where this
court said:
~'We

conclude that under the circumstances
disclosed in the record the instructions were misleading to the jury ; . . . they were repetitious and
. . . were premised on factual situations which
.were not supported by the evidence. In view of
the whole situation the court committed judicial
error in emphasizing its instructions as it did in
favor of the [plaintiff] and against the [defendant], and that therefore the [defendant] is end
titled to a new trial."
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN WITHDRAWING FROM THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE JURY THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A BUSINESS GUEST OR BARE
LICENSEE, AND IN FAILING TO ADVISE THE JURY OF
THE DIFFERENCE IN THE LEGAL DUTY OWED A BUSINESS GUEST., AND TO A LICENSEE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
By defendant's requests #6 and 7, it requested the
court to instruct the jury on the differences ,in the status
of licensees and invitees, and the differences in the duties
owed to them, as heretofore defined by this court, and
as set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Torts. R~e
quest #6 was as follows:
"'A business visitor or invitee, is one who
goes upon the premises of another by express or
implied invitation of the owner or occupant, and
in connection with the occupan'ts business, or
some mutual business with the occupant.
"A licensee is one who goes upon the land
or premises of another by the express or implied
permission of the other. By implied permission
is meant such permission as may be re:asonably
inferred from the words or acts of the possessor
of land, although not expressly authorized.
"In order for you to determine the relative
rights and duties between· the defendant and the
plaintiff, it will be necessary for you first to determine whether said plaintiff, at the time and
place of the accident, was an invitee or a licensee."

(R. 16.)
This is essentially a composite of J.I.F.U. Instructions 43.1, and 44.1.
Request #7 was as follows:
"A licensor, (that is a land owner or occupier), has no duty to prepare the way, or to make
it safe for a licensee. He has no obligation to
. change the method in which he conducts his business or activities so as to rnake it more safe for
the licensee. A licensee assumes the risk of any ·
conditions which he rnay encounter· on the licen-
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·' ..

sor's premises, and he has the duty to look out for
himself.
"If you find from the eviqence in this case
that plaintiff came into defendant's place of business only for his own purposes and pleasure, without paying an admission fee, and not to serve any
interest or advantage of the defendant, then said
plaintiff was, at best, only a licensee. Under those
circumstances, defendant would have no duty to
take any steps to make the premises safe for plaintiff. The only duty to plaintiff under such circumstances would be to warn him of dangers of which
defendant had actual knowledge and plaintiff had
no knowledge ; or dangers which plaintiff would
not realize involved an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to himself; and to avoid wilfully injuring
him.
"If you find from the evidence in this case,
that plaintiff was a licensee, and that the danger
of accident of the type which occurred was unknown to defendant, or as well known to plaintiff,
as to defendant; and that defendant did not wilfully injure said plaintiff, then your verdict should
be in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff,
no cause of action."

This request was based essentially on the rules set
forth in the following texts:
A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Torts, § -341, comment a:
"The licensee is not entitled to enter the land
of another except in so far as he is privileged to
do so by the possessor's consent. Therefore, the
· mere fact that the possessor has consented to his
entry gives hin1 no right to expect that the pos-
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sessor will change the Inethod in which he conducts his activity so as to secure the licensee's
safety. If he knows of the nature of the activities
conducted upon the land and the manner in which
they are conducted, he has all that he is entitled
to expect, that is an opportunity for an intelligent choice as to whether or not the advantage to
be gained by coming on the land is sufficient to
justify him in incurring the risks incident thereto."
Restatement of Torts, ~ .342.:

"A possessor of land is subject. to liability for
bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he
knows of the condition and realizes that
it involves an unrea.sonable risk to them and has
reason to believe that they will not discover the
condition or realize the risk, and
"a)

"b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable care

or

" (i)

to make the condition reasonably safe,

~' (ii)

to warn them of the condition and the
risk involved therein." (E.mphasis ours.)
There is no evidence in this case that defendant was
aware that the fence was inadequate to hold the bull, or
that defendant had any knowledge of any unreasonable
risk to plaintiff.
See comment c under ~ 342 :
"A possessor of land owes to a gratuitous
licensee no duty to prepare a safe place for the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
licensee's reception or to inspect the land to discover possible or even probable dangers.
"If the licensee is gratuitous, the privilege
to enter is a gift and the licensee, as the recipient
thereof, is entitled to expect nothing more than a
disclosure of the conditions which he will meet if
he acts upon the license and enters, in so far as
those conditio·ns are known to the giver of the
privilege." (Emphasis ours.)
S·ee also comment f thereunder :
"A possessor of land who permits gratuitous
licensees to enter thereon, is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to them by the dangerous
state in which he permits a natural or artificial
condition to remain, if, but only if, he not only
knows of the condvtiO'n but also realizes it involves
an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to
the particular licensee harmed thereby." (Emphasis ours.)
See also Prosser on Torts, 2nd ed., 445.
The plaintiff, by his own admission, was no better
than a licensee, since, admittedly, he came into the rodeo
gr.atuitously, although admission generally was by payment of an admission fee. He came not to serve ~y purpose of the defendant, but only to satisfy his own interest and curiosity. In view of the complete absence of
any evidence that defendant had any knowledge of any
dangerous defect or condition in the fence prior to the
rodeo, defendant was entitled to a peremptory instruction under the foregoing rules. At the very least defendant was entitled to have submitted to the jury for deterInination the issue of plaintiff's status on defendant's
prernises, the defendant's duty to plaintiff, and whether
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there. \vas :any breach of this duty. The denial of this
right was prejudicial and reversible error.
POINT VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE
TESTIMONY OF DR. HAIGHT.

Part of the drunages claimed by plaintiff was impairlnent of hearing in the right ear. His own testimony on
the subject (which was the only foundation laid for the
testimony of Dr. Haight) was very vague, and was as follows:
"Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Mr. Tom, one matter we want to get clear.
Before you were down to the fairgrounds at
the time you were injuredYes.
-before that, what was the condition of your
hearing as far as your right ear is conce-rned~
Well, it was-I was in pretty good health
at the time.
Were you able to hear as far as you could
observe as well, normally out of right ear~
Yes, sir.

Q. Now, have you observed whether or not you
can hear normally out of your right ear since
then~

A. Not so good.

Q. Has that been in any way affected by this
affray in January of 1964, last-just last
January~ Did that affect your hearing'
A. No. That was since that first time." (R. 24142.)
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"Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

. "Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Mr. Tom, when did you first notice that you
were having memory problems~
That is the first time when I was in the hospital when I woke up. I didn't hear nothing
on this side, and afterwards I kind of get that
hearing.
How about the hearing in your left ear, the
other ear from the right, your left ear~ Do
you understand what I mean by 'left ear'~.
Yes.
Had you had an impairment or loss of hearing
in your left earNo.
-before this injury with the bull~
No." (R. 242-43.)
Now, do you notice at this time what the condition of the hearing in your left ear is~ ;Can
you hear normally in your left ear now?
Yes.
You can hear normally in your left ear now'
Yes.
Now, so as far as you are able to observe, the
hearing problem you have is in your right ear.
Is that correct~
Yes.
Now, can you answer 'Yes' or 'No'~
Yes.
Mr. Tom, do you observe whether or not this
hearing in your right ear is getting better or
worse or remaining the sal_lle ~
Remained the same." (R. 243.) .-
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No details- were offered as to whether the claimed
loss of hearing was sudden or gradual, or when it was
first noticed. No claim of impaired hearing in the left
ear was made by plaintiff.
Superi1nposed on the above quoted testimony was
Dr. Haight's testimony as to the extent of plaintiff's hearing loss in both ears as set forth in our statement of facts.
However, Dr. Haight frankly and repeatedly admitted
that he did not know, and that there was no way of determining _whether the accident of July, 196,2 was either the
sole or a contributing cause of plaintiff's hearing impairment, or whether it was caused solely by other accident, or whether it was caused by non-traumatic means.
No effort was made by plaintiff's attorneys to establish a
causal relationship between the injury and the accident
by the use of hypothetical questions or in any other approved manner. Thus the testimony of DT. Haight, as
to the extent of plaintiff's hearing loss in both ears, was
left standing with the jury without any competent evidence whatsoever on which to base a finding that the
accident here involved was a cause of such loss. The size
of the jury's verdict strongly suggests that the jury considered that plaintiff sustain.ed a substantial hearing loss
as a result of this accident. Such a finding would have to
rest on pure conjecture and speculation, in which the jury
is not permitted to indulge. Clearly it was prejudicial
error to permit the testimony of Dr. Haight to stand.
This appears to fall within the principles of M oorc
v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 4 Ut. 2d, 255, 292 P. 2d 849.
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It was there recognized that mere possibilities are not
probative. The refusal of the court to strike Dr. Haight's
testimony was erroneous and seriously prejudicial to defendant's case.
POINT VII.
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IS EXCESSIVE AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

It is undisputed that plaintiff sustained a linear skull
fracture, requiring his hospitalization for a period of 17
days. His total medical expense for treatment was
$-548.80. By the testimony of his doctor, the fracture.
would normally heal uneventfully, and assumedly did.
There was some vague evidence that the plaintiff may
have sustained some impairment of memory as a result
of the accident, although such symptom did not appear
u11til after he had been involved in two later episodes
inv~lving injury to his head. No effort was made to
assess or define the extent of this purported loss. There
was no. competent medical evidence to connect the claimed.loss of hearing with the rodeo accident. There was no
evidence whatsoever of any impairment in earnings or
earning Gapacity. In short, there is no evidence of any
signi~icant loss to the plaintiff whatsoever, beyond a relatively brief period of temporary disability, and an award
of.$18,000, general .damages, appears to be based purely
on sympathy and passion, unsupported by any competent
evidence.
Since the decision of thi.s court in J (3nsen_ v. D.~. & R.
G. W. R., Co., 4-± lTt. 100, 138 P. 1185, it. has been well

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
established in this state that this court will not hesitate
to set aside an excessive verdict appearing to have been
given as a result of passion and prejudice and not based
on the evidence. In that case this court said:
"Still the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled and unchecked. Hence the 'Code that a new
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may be
granted by the court below on the ground of 'excessive damages appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.'
Whenever that is made to appear, the court, when
its action is properly invoked, should require a
remission or set the verdict aside and grant a new
trial.''
Also apropos here is the language of this court in
the case of Duffy v. U.P.R. Co., 118 Ut. 82, 218 P.2d 1080,
where this court said :
"We must assume that the jury awarded
plaintiff the sum of $1,300 for loss of wages, which
were his only established special damages, and
this leaves the sum of $11,200 for general damages.
When we get into this domain reasonable minds
differ as to what amount is excessive. However,
there must be a limit beyond which ~ reasonable
jury cannot go and the limit must be determined
on the gross amount of the verdict and not the net
amount. Conceding that jurors in different states
and counties have different n1onetary standards
and different ideas as to the value of pain and suffering; that present day costs of living are comparatively high; that the purchasing power of the
dollar has decreased to approximately one~half
of what it was some ten years ago; that we are
seemingly in an inflationary spiral; and, that by
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all reasonable standards verdicts should. be larger
than they were at that period; we are, nevertheless, of the opinion in this case that the damages
awarded by the jury have no foundation in fact,
and are so grossly excessive and eocorbitant as to
convince the members of this Court that the verdict is far in excess of what a reasonable jury
could determine as the maximum amount awardable for this type of injury. ***
''Previously decided cases are of little value
in fixing present day standards or in assisting
courts in determining excessive awards. Both the
court and the jury are required to deal :with many
. unknown factors and a good guess is about the
best that can be hoped for. The permissible minimum and maximum limits within which a jury
may operate for a given injury are presently
far apart and must continue to be widespread
so long as pain and suffe-ring must be measured
by money standards. * * *
·
"In this instance we conclude there was an
abuse of discretion and that a new trial should
have been granted or a remittitur requested. ***"
And in Stamp v. U.P.R. Co., 5 Ut. 2d 397, 303 P.2d
279, this court said:
"We are of the opinion that the award made
by the jury has no basis in fact. Such an award
is so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion or prejudice, and it abundantly appears that there is no
evidence to support or justify the verdict. The
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a new trial or in ordering a remittitur."
We are fully mindful of 'vhat this court said in the
Duffy case concerning the value of precedents on the
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issue of excessive damages. We recognize that so many
variable factors enter into the determination of damages
in each case, that the award in any one particular case
is not of much value as a guide in determining what is
fair and reasonable in another case. However, for whatever assistance they may be to the court, we invite attention to the following cases, wherein the injuries sustained by the plaintiff appear to be of the same nature
and of a severity equal to or greater than those sustained
by the plaintiff in the case at bar:
In Cermak v. Hertz Corp., 5 N.J. S·uper. 455, 147 A2d
800, the court said:
"Plaintiffs proved special damages were less
than $1000. His subjective complaints included
headaches, pains in his ears and head radiating
down through his spine and back, deafness, a
heavy feeling in his eyes, pain in back of his head
which bothers him constantly, pain in both· shoulders and in the center and sides of neck, sorness
of the muscles of the neck and the back of ears
_and pain in the sacroiliac and sciatic nerve which
radiate across the bottom of his back. Plaintiff
also testified that at the time of the trial he was
still suffering from the pains in the head, eyes,
shoulders, neck muscles, lower back and right leg.
He testified that his hearing had been affected
and that he suffered a partial loss thereof. He
said he still has trouble in moving the head and
neck and that the neck stiffens up easily if he
makes any awkward motion which handicaps him
especially when working and that he has become
nervous since the accident."
A judgment in the arnount of $8500 was order<~d reduced to $6,000.
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In Gillogly v. New England 1"'ransp. Co., 73 R.I. 45·6,
57 A2.d 411, the court said :
"It is clear that the plaintiff suffered lJainful
injuries to the head, face, and chest, but apparently those responded to treatment within a few
months; and that she also suffered injuries to the
lower back and pelvic region, which were painful
incapacitating, but the prognosis as to when she
would completely recover therefrom was uncertain.

* * *

'J

'' ... Without going further into detail as to
plaintiff's complaints of pain, headache, loss of
sleep, and nervousness, or the nature of the treatment that she received from time to time, the evidence in substance shows that she returned to
work in the latter part of September, 1942; that
thereafter she could not work continuously until
September 1944, and that up to the trial she was
at times forced to stop working because of pain
in the back or head-aches.

"There is evidence ... that plaintiff's actual
. expenditures were somewhat in excess of $2,700.
. -· However, proof of loss due to her inability to work
-is tenuous. What effect, if any, she may suffer in
the future from her injuries, as testified to by her
doctors, is uncertain. When these elements of
.damages are fairly considered in connection with
plaintiff's right to reasonable compensation for
pain and suffering, it is clear to us that the award
of $12,000 is clearly excessive. In our opinion the
sum of $8,000 will fully compensate the plaintiff
without injustice to the defendant.''
See also Corte v. St. Louis Pub. S.ervice Co., (Mo.),
370 SW2d 29'7, where the court ordered a .reduction· _of_ a
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verdict for $22,500 by the amount of $8500. In that case
plaintiff had sustained a very severe head injury requiring the boring of holes in his skull on both sides, and
had incurred special damages, including loss of wages of
approximately $3-500.
CON'CL USION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence adduced does not support the jury's findings in plaintiff's
favor on the issue of liability; that the jury was not correctly instructed in the law; that the court erred in rulings on evidence; that the award of damages is excessive,
showing passion and prejudice; and that defendant is
entitled to have the vedict set aside, and either to have
judgment in its favor, or a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRIST'ENS·E·N AND JE·NS·E·N
By RAY R. CHRIS·TENSEN
Attorneys for defendarnt and appellant.

1205 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake ·City, Utah
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